This dissertation explores the role and effects of fairness in dynamically complex supply chains, defining fairness as impartial treatment without favoritism. In economic research, fairness is often represented as inequity aversion, where individuals prefer equitable monetary outcomes. While various models of inequity aversion have been developed, they fall short in addressing environments with multiple decision-makers interacting over time. The first part of the dissertation reviews commonly used inequity aversion models to address these limitations. The second part employs extended models in a computer-based simulation study, focusing on the Beer Distribution Game to analyze the impact of inequity-averse decision-makers. Findings from the simulations lead to several hypotheses tested in an experimental study in the third part. The results indicate that inequity aversion significantly influences supply chain decision-making, even with only one human actor present. Additionally, contrary to existing literature, the distributor stage, rather than the factory stage, experiences the most adverse effects in a supply chain facing order amplification, primarily due to perceived unfairness and limited influence over performance.
