From the Korean War to the conflict in Iraq, this book examines the ways in which the American public decides whether to support the use of military force. Contrary to the conventional view, it demonstrates that the public does not respond reflexively and solely to the number of casualties in a conflict.
How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state.
The book explores the longstanding divide between civilian and military perspectives in U.S. foreign policy, particularly during the Iraq invasion debate. It highlights the reluctance of military leaders to engage in conflict and the civilian hawks pushing for action, alongside public apprehension about war casualties. This dynamic is presented as a recurring theme in American history, influencing decisions since 1816. The new afterword by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi connects these historical patterns to the ongoing Iraq war, emphasizing their impact on current policy.
The book explores the public's confidence in the military, highlighting a significant partisan divide, with Republicans showing much higher levels of trust compared to Democrats and Independents. Feaver delves into the reasons behind this confidence, revealing its implications for policymakers. He warns that both confidence and over-confidence can influence public attitudes toward military engagement, potentially undermining effective civil-military relations in a democracy. The analysis provides critical insights into how perceptions of the military shape national discourse on the use of force.
A definitive study on the decades-long run of high public confidence in the military and why it may rest on some shaky foundations. What explains the high levels of public confidence in the US military and does high confidence matter? In Thanks for Your Service, the eminent civil-military relations scholar Peter D. Feaver addresses this question and focuses on what it means for the military. Proprietary survey data show that confidence is partly based on public beliefs about the military's high competence, adherence to high professional ethics, and a determination to stand apart from the bitter divisions of partisan politics. However, as Feaver argues, confidence is also shaped by a partisan gap and by social desirability bias, the idea that some individuals express confidence in the military because they believe that is the socially approved attitude to hold. Not only does Feaver help us understand how and why the public has confidence in the military, but he also exposes problems that policymakers need to be aware of. Specifically, this book traces how confidence in the institution shapes public attitudes on the use of force and may not always reinforce best practices in democratic civil-military relations.