Reiner Schürmann Bücher

Ein junger Deutscher in den sechziger Jahren wird von einer übergroßen Sensibilität für die Allgegenwart der Vergangenheit heimgesucht. Er trägt die Unfähigkeit, zu vergessen, was er nicht bewusst erlebt hat: Krieg und Vernichtung. Die autobiographisch geprägte Erzählung folgt seiner Suche nach den eigenen Ursprüngen und zeichnet Aufbrüche, Fluchten und Irrwege nach. Kindheitserlebnisse der unmittelbaren Nachkriegsjahre auf dem väterlichen Fabrikgelände wecken quälende Fragen. Ein Jahr im israelischen Kibbuz ist geprägt von Überschwang und Angst, während Freiburg der späten sechziger Jahre, eine Idylle des Vergessens, durch den Besuch eines jüdischen Freundes wiederersteht. Schließlich teilt er das Bemühen um eine akademische Anstellung in Amerika mit zahlreichen Emigranten, was zu grotesken Begegnungen und einer neuen Zukunft führt. Diese sehr persönliche Erzählung ist ein Schlüssel zum Verständnis einer ganzen Generation zwischen Enttäuschung und Wut, Anpassung und Aufbegehren. Die Schreibweise ist von irritierender Präzision, entwaffnender Direktheit und schmerzhafter Konsequenz geprägt. Das Werk, das 1976 in Frankreich erschien und mit dem Prix Broquette-Gonin ausgezeichnet wurde, ist auch für heutige Generationen von großer Bedeutung.

Through the lenses of Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, this edited volume traces the development of the relation between the will and the law as self-given. Modern Philosophies of the Will explores a variety of topics including: the ontological turn in philosophy of the will; the will’s playful character and the problem of teleology; the will as principle of morality as discussed by Kant, of life­forms as discussed by Nietzsche, and of technology as discussed by Heidegger; the formal identity of legislation; and transgression of the law. This volume traces three strategies in the development of the philosophy of will from Kant to Heidegger, through rationality and irrationality of the will, the ontological turn, and law.

In this book, Reiner Schürmann argues that what is most original about Marx is his philosophical axis. Extending his highly original engagement with the history of philosophy, Schürmann draws out this axis, which determines and localizes his theories of history, social relations, and economy. Whereas Marxist readings of Marx conceive history, classes, and social relations as primary realities, Schürmann brings out a radically immanent understanding of praxis that introduces multiplicity. This edition is complemented by a reprinting of Schürmann’s Anti-Humanism essay, in which he reads Marx alongside Nietzsche and Heidegger as spelling out the dissociation of being and action. Reading Marx showcases underappreciated facets of Schürmann’s work and offers an interpretation of Marx that resonates with the readings of Jacques Derrida, Michel Henry, Antonio Negri, and François Laruelle.

In Being and Time , Heidegger announced the “Task of Destroying the History of Ontology” in order to free what had remained “unthought” in Western metaphysics. The unpublished part of that work was to be titled “Basic Features of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology. According to the Guiding Thread of the Problem of Temporality.” This latest work in the Reiner Schürmann Selected Writings and Lecture Notes series aims to carry out Heidegger’s plan. The destruction, or, as it is later called, the deconstruction of metaphysics, has a negative side—the peeling off, or the archeology, of metaphysical history by means of the guiding thread of the question of Being—and a positive side—“retrieval” of the original experience of Being in ancient Greek philosophy. “The destruction has no other intent than to win back the original experience of metaphysics through a deconstruction of those conceptions which have become current and empty.” The purpose of taking to pieces the fabric of Western metaphysics is to show how at each important stage “the question of the meaning of Being has not only remained unattended to or inadequately raised, but that it has become quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in 'metaphysics'.”