This text explores the relationship between the philosophies of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, presenting a new argument for their complementarity within a collaborative metatheory of science. It posits that both thinkers advocate for epistemological naturalism, grounded in shared philosophical principles, and suggests that the scope of epistemological naturalism is broader than previously indicated by Quinean orthodoxy. The work builds upon and critiques four decades of scholarship, offering a fresh interpretation of Carnap's view on analyticity, which counters the Quinean claim that naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction are incompatible. By doing so, it highlights the significance of their scientific metatheory for contemporary philosophical inquiries in the philosophy of science. The text is geared towards students and researchers engaged with Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy, and naturalized epistemology. It includes sections on naturalism in the Vienna Circle, Neurath's epistemology and protocol statements, Carnapian explication, and the challenges to bipartite metatheory interpretation, culminating in its application.
