Herbert Hochberg Bücher

The book contains the first systematic study of the ontology and metaphysics of Gustav Bergmann, tracing their development from early (1940s) criticisms of Carnap’s semantical theories in Introduction to Semantics, to their culmination in his 1992 New Foundations of Ontology . This involves a detailed study of the implicit metaphysical doctrines in Carnap’s important, but long neglected, 1942 book and their connection to his influential views on reference, truth and modality, (including, contrary to current opinion, Carnap’s initiating the development of predicate modal logic) that culminated in Meaning and Necessity . In dealing with various fundamental issues in ontology and metaphysics, the book discusses relevant views of major philosophers, such as Russell, Moore, Bradley, Wittgenstein, Meinong, Brentano, Husserl, Broad, McTaggart, and Quine, and of contemporary and recent figures, including D. M. Armstrong, D. Lewis, S. Kripke, J. Searle, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, J. J. C. Smart, and H. Feigl. Building on the critical studies of Bergmann, Carnap and such other philosophers, the author argues for a form of Logical Realism derived from important, but long misunderstood and ignored, aspects of Russell’s theories of descriptions, reference and truth.

Philosophy took a “linguistic turn” in the twentieth century that was marked by the focus on theories of meaning, reference, description, predication and truth. Starting with the roots of the analytic tradition in Frege, Meinong and Bradley, this book follows its development in Russell and Wittgenstein and the writings of major philosophers of the analytic tradition and of various lesser, but well known and widely discussed, contemporary figures. In dealing with basic issues that have preoccupied analytic philosophers in the past century, the author notes how analytic philosophy is some-times transformed from its original concern with careful and precise formulations of classical issues into the dismissal of such issues and the resultant spinning of intricate verbal webs, often si-gnaling the rebirth of idealism in the guises of “contextualism” and “anti-realism.” The book thus examines the change that came to dominate the analytic tradition by a shift of focus from the world, as what words are about, to a preoccupation with language itself

Interest in the age-old problems of universals and individuation has received a new impetus from the current revival of ontology in the analytic tradition, the development of theories of individual properties (and the related application of mereological calculi to the analysis of predication), and the particular problems posed by relational predication and the nature of particulars. The essays explore aspects of the history of the issues and attempt to deal with the issues and with challenges to the distinctions that give rise to them. They continue the debates stemming from the revival of metaphysics rooted in Freges realism, the Austrian tradition of Brentano-Husserl-Meinong, and the early 20th century revolt against idealism embodied in writings of Moore and Russell and culminating in Wittgensteins Tractatus.

This work engages critically with contemporary nominalism, materialism, and idealism, defending realism about universals and a correspondence theory of truth against prominent philosophers like Quine, Sellars, Goodman, and Davidson. The collection of essays represents a systematic critique of nominalism and a robust defense of realism, drawing on the theories of truth and reference from Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Bergmann. It includes critical analyses of key themes in the writings of Frege and Carnap, establishing a foundation for examining thought and intentionality, as well as addressing issues related to logical concepts, negation, false belief, facts, and possibilities. Detailed discussions on Russell's theories of reference, description, logical form, and identity are presented, alongside an evaluation of Quine's adaptation of Russellian ideas regarding ontological commitment and proper names. Alternative accounts of reference and description, notably those by Strawson, are also scrutinized. The essays focus on the ontological dimensions underlying essential problems in the philosophy of logic and language, collectively aiming to address the ontological challenges associated with reference, predication, and truth. This work will appeal to philosophers, logicians, linguists, and historians of contemporary philosophy.