Martin Kusch Bücher

'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much of its (modern) history. Often these reflections have been inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the 'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth' politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch examines some of the most influential relativist proposals of the last fifty years, and the controversies they have triggered. He argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' – that is the thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par. Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of relativism and post-truth thinking.

Martin Kusch defends Saul Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put forward over the years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning and that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position.

What can humans do? What can machines do? How do humans delegate actions to machines?In this book, Harry Collins and Martin Kusch combine insights from sociology and philosophy toprovide a novel answer to these increasingly important questions.The authors begin by distinguishingbetween two basic types of intentional behavior, which they call polimorphic actions andmimeomorphic actions. Polimorphic actions (such as writing a love letter) are ones that communitymembers expect to vary with social context. Mimeomorphic actions (such a swinging a golf club) donot vary. Although machines cannot act, they can mimic mimeomorphic actions. Mimeomorphic actionsare thus the crucial link between what humans can do and what machines cando. Following a presentation of their detailed categorization of actions, theauthors apply their approach to a broad range of human-machine interactions and to learning. Keyexamples include bicycle riding and the many varieties of writing machines. They also show how theirtheory can be used to explain the operation of organizations such as restaurants and armies.Finally, they look at a historical case -- the technological development of the air pump -- applyingtheir categorization of actions to the processes of mechanization and automation. Automation, theyargue, can occur only where what we want to bring about can be brought about through mimeomorphicaction.

Challenging traditional views, this work posits that psychological knowledge functions as a social institution rather than solely existing within individual minds. It suggests that mental states are social artifacts, comparable to objects like coins or crowns, emphasizing the collective nature of psychological understanding. This perspective invites readers to reconsider the foundations of psychological knowledge and its implications in society.

The authors explore the distinction between polimorphic and mimeomorphic actions to analyze human-machine interactions. Polimorphic actions, which vary with context, contrast with mimeomorphic actions, which remain consistent. They argue that while machines mimic mimeomorphic actions, true human actions cannot be replicated. The book applies this framework to various examples, including writing machines and organizational operations, and examines historical technological developments like the air pump to illustrate how automation is linked to mimeomorphic actions.