Martin Kusch Bücher

'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much of its (modern) history. Often these reflections have been inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the 'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth' politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch examines some of the most influential relativist proposals of the last fifty years, and the controversies they have triggered. He argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' – that is the thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par. Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of relativism and post-truth thinking.

Martin Kusch defends Saul Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put forward over the years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning and that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position.

The authors explore the distinction between polimorphic and mimeomorphic actions to analyze human-machine interactions. Polimorphic actions, which vary with context, contrast with mimeomorphic actions, which remain consistent. They argue that while machines mimic mimeomorphic actions, true human actions cannot be replicated. The book applies this framework to various examples, including writing machines and organizational operations, and examines historical technological developments like the air pump to illustrate how automation is linked to mimeomorphic actions.

Challenging traditional views, this work posits that psychological knowledge functions as a social institution rather than solely existing within individual minds. It suggests that mental states are social artifacts, comparable to objects like coins or crowns, emphasizing the collective nature of psychological understanding. This perspective invites readers to reconsider the foundations of psychological knowledge and its implications in society.