Metaphor, metonymy, and experientialist philosophy

This book offers a thorough critique of experientialist semantics, addressing both philosophical issues and cognitive approaches to metaphor and metonymy, with a focus on the works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, alongside other cognitivists. Verena Haser introduces a novel perspective on distinguishing metaphor from metonymy, diverging from traditional cognitivist models while incorporating valuable insights from existing research. She challenges the concept of conceptual metaphors as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, suggesting that they do not effectively explain metaphorical transfer. Instead, she argues that the clustering of metaphorical expressions is better understood through family resemblances. Another significant aim is to reevaluate the connection between experientialism and traditional Western philosophy, often referred to as "objectivism." This work distinguishes itself from other critiques by providing detailed analyses of key passages from Lakoff and Johnson, allowing Haser to identify internal inconsistencies and shortcomings overlooked in prior discussions. The book is pertinent for students and scholars in semantics, cognitive linguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of language.