Changes in corporate governance and corporate valuation

Germany as a federal republic has different forms of government, and similar to this, you find a lot of different forms of corporate government. The public debate about corporate governance and shareholder activism was boosted by the labeling of private-equity-investors as „locusts“ causing extensive damage and thus requiring more regulatory efforts. In this context the academic discussion faces two facts: On the one hand, it is necessary to consider large and active shareholders, but on the other hand it is more important to know and determine who they are. Upon this starting point the present dissertation works on different research questions: How is a blockholder’s ability to solve the agency problem between managers and owners? Can an active blockholder change the objective function of a company? Does the transition of ownership of a state-owned enterprise improve the operating and financial performance? Mark Mietzner´s dissertation – published as volume 13 of the „DIRK-Forschungsreihe“ – consequently compares the differences of value creation between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds as active shareholders, shows the effects of shareholder activism and concentrates on results of different exit strategies.