At 5 pm on 29 October 1956, Israeli tanks invaded Egypt with the aim of swiftly crossing the fortified Sinai Desert to lift the Egyptian blockade of their Red Sea port and prevent Colonel Nasser from strengthening his military capabilities. In response, Britain and France declared their intent to separate the warring parties and ensure free passage through the nationalized Suez Canal. They deployed air and seaborne troops to secure the Canal, but after gaining control of only twenty-three miles, they were compelled to withdraw by a UN Security Council resolution initiated by the United States demanding unconditional exit. For nearly twenty-five years, the Suez crisis has sparked intense debate. A new perspective emerges from one of its key political figures, Selwyn Lloyd, who contends that the operation addressed a critical issue in the Middle East that could have escalated into a significant international crisis. His narrative does not seek self-aggrandizement or claim that the British government was infallible. Instead, he posits that the Suez incident became a scapegoat for Britain’s declining global influence and economic struggles. His candid account provides valuable insights into the conflict as perceived by Eden's administration.
