Calculus of Consent

Mehr zum Buch

Co-authored by Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, this classic work represents a significant shift in understanding how democracies operate. As noted by Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, it is a timeless exploration of political organization through the lens of economic principles. The authors, while acknowledging their discomfort as economists delving into political analysis, are motivated by the potential insights their perspective can provide. Their goal is to examine the rational individual's decision-making process concerning constitutional choice, focusing on decision-making rules. They introduce the concept of "economic individualism," arguing that while individual choice in market contexts has been extensively studied, the dynamics of individual decision-making in public sector group actions remain largely overlooked. Written in the early 1960s, this work has become foundational for the public choice movement, for which Buchanan is renowned. As a distinguished economist and Nobel laureate, Buchanan is recognized as one of the leading scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. The series encompasses various volumes addressing topics such as public debt, public finance, and the limits of liberty, reflecting the breadth of Buchanan's contributions to economic and political thought.